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EU and German policymakers often promote federalism as a means to 
strengthen peace in societies emerging from civil war. In Nepal, however, 
the 2015 constitution which restructured the country to make it a federal 
republic has become a driver of new violence. This contribution argues that 
it is not only the substance of the federalist law that has inspired unrest, but 
also the manner in which it was introduced.
 • Constitutional provisions stipulating geography-based federalism in Nepal 
sparked protests among Madhesis and Tharus that killed 57 people and stalled 
imports of petroleum and earthquake relief material from India from Septem-
ber 2015 to February 2016.
 • The Madhesis and Tharus feel that the federalist law further discriminates 
against them and are demanding the delineation of federal units according to 
identity. While the constitution was initially perceived as a major breakthrough 
in the frequently stalled peace process with former Maoist rebels, the Madhesi 
and Tharu protests represent a new escalation in a long-polarised debate.
 • Three factors have contributed to the violent escalation of the protests: (1) the 
dominance in the public debate of hill-upper-caste groups at the expense of 
marginalised groups; (2) the concurrence of the federalist reform with other in-
stitutional reforms that, as a whole, have sparked fears of discrimination among 
Madhesis and Tharus; and (3) increasing involvement on the part of China and 
India, which is further polarising the government and the marginalised groups. 
 • The example of Nepal reflects and accentuates the recent debate on post-war 
institutional reform – that is, that reforms have joint effects on peace rather 
than working in isolation.
Policy Implications
Policymakers must ensure that a future solution to minority demands in Nepal is 
identified based on dialogue that includes minorities to a larger extent; any elite 
proposition could lead to new unrest. Nepal also demonstrates that subnational 
and national institutional reforms as a whole can ease or exacerbate minority 
fears. Donors should pay attention to such interaction rather than limiting pro-
jects to one policy field.
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Violent Unrest in Post-Earthquake Nepal
on 20 September 2015, 89 per cent of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly representa-
tives approved a new constitution for the Himalayan country. The urgent need to 
begin reconstruction after the devastating 7.8- and 7.3-magnitude earthquakes on 
25 April and 12 May 2015, which killed over 8,700 people, had accelerated a long-
stalled constitutional debate. The final document represented a breakthrough in the 
peace negotiations with former Maoist rebels, which had begun nine years earlier 
with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). A central provision 
of the new constitution is the restructuring of Nepal into seven federal provinces 
that are delineated according to physical geographical characteristics, as well as on 
the basis of existing administrative divisions. 
Federalist reform has long been one of the most contentious issues in Nepal’s 
constitutional process, but since August 2015, Nepalese society has become ever 
more polarised on the question of whether federal states should be delineated ac-
cording to identity rather than geography. Identity-based demands are an integral 
element of Nepalese politics, and cleavages as based on various identity markers 
– such as ethnicity, religion, gender, region, or caste – making it difficult to give 
exact figures on how strongly all groups are represented in the population. The 2011 
census, for instance, records 125 caste and ethnic groups, 123 languages spoken as 
a mother tongue, and 10 religious groups. Table 1 outlines the most important iden-
tity groups for the purpose of this contribution.
In August 2015, the Tharu and Madhesi communities from Nepal’s southern 
Tarai plains – identity groups who have long held substantial resentments against 
the state for its failure to address their political and economic exclusion and sys-
tematic discrimination – began protesting against the constitutional provisions 
for federalism. These groups argued that the federal structures stipulated in the 
new constitution would oppress their interests because they would, for instance, 
result in unequal resource distribution and their political underrepresentation at 
the centre and would thereby further marginalise the already marginalised. Their 
accompanying demands focused on four central issues: (1) identity-based federal-
ism instead of geography-based federalism, (2) increased proportional representa-
tion within state institutions and the electoral system, (3) equal citizenship rights 
Table 1.  
Major Identity 
Groups in Nepal
Madhesi An umbrella term for Muslims and caste-based Hindus living in Nepal’s 
southern Tarai plains who have close socio-economic and cultural ties to nor-
thern India and who make up approximately 35% of the total population
Tharu An ethnic group that is indigenous to the southern and far-western Tarai 
plains and that makes up approximately 7% of the total population
Janajati A Nepali word for “indigenous people,” which is used as an umbrella term for 
a number of ethnic and linguistic groups outside the Hindu caste system
Dalit “Untouchables,” the lowest social group in the Hindu caste system. There are 
also Madhesi Dalits, who make up approximately 4% of the population 
Upper-Caste, 
High-Caste
Terms often used to refer to Hindus of the Bahun and Chhetri caste groups 
from the hill districts (approx. 29% of the population), although there are also 
high-caste Hindus in the southern Tarai plains
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for men and women, and (3) the delineation of electoral constituencies based on 
population density. 
In order to make their demands heard, the United Democratic Madhesi Front 
(UDMF) – an umbrella organisation for Madhesi parties – called for the blockading 
of customs checkpoints at the Nepal–India border on 23 September 2015, effec-
tively stalling imports of petroleum, medicine, food, and earthquake relief material 
from India. The poor and those affected by the earthquake were hit the hardest. 
Nepal’s government immediately accused the Indian government of supporting the 
blockade, not least because the long-standing cultural, family, and socio-economic 
links of Nepal’s Madhesi population to the north-Indian state of Bihar mean that 
Madhesis are often not seen as “true” Nepalis. Some hill-based elites feared that 
granting Madhesis more autonomy would lead to the disintegration of Nepal.   
In November 2015, it was reported that the border blockade had resulted in 
a worse economic crisis than the earthquake and UNICEF (2015) warned that a 
shortage of food and medicine meant that three million children were at risk of 
death or disease. By January 2016, 57 people – including eight police officers – had 
died in clashes between officers and protesters in the Tarai. The government and 
the protesting parties had already met for several rounds of talks, but when the 
largest political parties unilaterally amended the constitution on 23 January 2016 
to increase the Madhesi presence in government bodies through proportional rep-
resentation, the UDMF boycotted the vote and argued that this amendment was 
incomplete, as it did not address its key demand: the revision of federal boundaries. 
on 8 February 2016, four days after the end of the 135-day blockade, however, the 
UDMF formally announced an end to protest activities, partly because many of its 
protesters were so frustrated and disillusioned by the process that they were less 
and less willing to block the border checkpoints.
While the first constitutional amendment played a role in ending the blockade, 
it did not solve the underlying conflict, and the UDMF has stated that it will con-
tinue to protest until Tharus and Madhesis are granted separate states. The elites 
from the main political parties in Kathmandu strongly oppose this demand and 
argue that such identity-based federalism would create “ethnic ghettoes” and in-
crease social divisions in Nepal (ICG 2016). The risk of escalating violence in the 
Tarai thus remains, and given that the Tarai has a history of armed groups (there 
were more than 100 armed groups active in 2009), continued disillusionment on 
the part of the Madhesis might drive an angry population towards radical groups. 
Thus, while the federalist provisions in the new constitution represent the symbolic 
end of the peace process with Maoist rebels, they have at the same time driven new 
violence, thereby raising the following questions: What makes federalism a problem 
rather than a solution in Nepal? How can the crisis be solved? And what lessons 
can we learn from Nepal for the future promotion of federalism in post-war states?
Federalism as an Instrument for Post-War Peacebuilding 
In Nepal, it was the Maoist rebels belonging to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
who, after waging a decade-long civil war against the government from 1996 to 2006, 
demanded a new constitution that would restructure the country into a federalist re-
public. The Maoist request thereby reflected a global trend, as federalism has increas-
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ingly emerged since the end of the Cold War as a tool for peacebuilding promoted by 
international policymakers and a demand made by warring parties engaged in vio-
lence. It has been discussed or implemented in places as diverse as Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (in the 1995 Dayton Agreement); Sudan (where it was a key issue in various 
peace agreements from 2004 to 2007); and more recently Syria, where Kurdish parties 
in particular have regularly called for federalism as a solution to the ongoing civil war. 
Several analyses have promoted federalism as an effective tool for post-war 
peacebuilding and regard it as a vital ingredient for the stabilisation of peace after 
war. These proponents stress that federalist arrangements that devolve political 
authority from the central government to federal provinces mitigate fears of ex-
ploitation among marginalised identity groups by limiting discriminatory practices 
within state institutions and providing for a system of checks and balances (Lake 
and Rothchild 2005). These authors also argue that the federal restructuring of 
post-war states addresses the economic insecurities of marginalised groups, in-
creases efficiency within the war-torn civic administration system, and generally 
satisfies local demands for cultural and political autonomy. 
In contrast, opponents of the implementation of federalist structures after war 
argue that such arrangements can create parallel structures of political authority 
that further weaken war-torn societies if tasks are not clearly defined and separated 
between political levels (Wolff 2009). These authors further believe that federalism 
impairs prospects for post-war peace because it reinforces divisive group identities 
(for instance, between ethnic groups in Bosnia), and that it creates new instabil-
ity and secessionist demands – for instance, because it provides regional identity 
groups with the ability to finance and mobilise for new violence to a greater extent 
than in centralised states. These authors have also stressed that federalism on its 
own is often insufficient to generate long-term solutions to civil war and that fed-
eralist reforms, if they are to stand a chance of furthering the peace process, must 
be embedded in broader institutional reform processes at the central government 
level. Empirical evidence shows that in post-war societies, federalism is most help-
ful when combined with other conflict resolution instruments, particularly power-
sharing arrangements within the central government (Wolff 2009).
The Evolution of the Federalist Debate in Nepal
The debate in Nepal reflects these opposing positions voiced within the academic 
community. While the debate has been the single most divisive issue in Nepal’s 
political discourse since the CPA, federalism is by no means a new topic; it has been 
passionately discussed since it was first proposed in the 1940s. At that time, Nepal 
was ruled through an authoritarian system of hereditary prime ministers within the 
Rana family that systematically benefited Chhetris and Bahuns – the hill-upper-
caste Hindus who continue to make up the political and economic elite today. The 
Madhesis from the southern Tarai, on the other hand, had to obtain written per-
mission to enter the capital Kathmandu (Hachhethu 2007). After a short period of 
democracy in the 1950s, authoritarian rule was reinstated and remained in place 
until 1990, when the first People’s Movement started a transition to democracy. 
But even with the rise of democracy in the early 1990s, the traditional ruling 
elite of male, high-caste hill-origin Hindus monopolised the political system, and 
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Nepal remained a unitary monarchy with Nepali as its sole official language. [1] De-
mands for federalism and increased autonomy continued to be made in the Tarai, 
where Madhesis and Tharus still experienced the state apparatus as distant and 
largely unresponsive to their grievances. Well-paid jobs in the administration were 
held by high-caste groups, and the security forces in the Tarai – particularly the 
police – were largely made up of hill-origin officers. Peaceful movements in the 
early 1990s called for increased representation and autonomy rights for the various 
identity groups, and these movements began to influence the political discourse on 
how to restructure the state. 
From 1996 onwards, it was the Maoist rebels who capitalised on the aspira-
tions of marginalised communities. Their insurgency boosted the federalist agenda 
in the Tarai, as the rebels induced Madhesis and Tharus to join their campaign by 
promising to fight for these identity groups’ federal autonomy. In November 2006, 
the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance – a coalition of the biggest political parties 
in Kathmandu – signed the CPA, and Nepal was declared a republic following the 
Maoists’ electoral victory in April 2008. The Maoists then politically promoted the 
idea of delineating 13 federal provinces, the majority on the basis of identity groups. 
While the transition to federalism was a predominantly Maoist aim after the 
CPA, today most parties – some more enthusiastically than others – have accepted 
the idea that Nepal should become a federalist republic, and federalism was thus 
mentioned in almost all party manifestos in the 2008 and 2013 Constitutional As-
sembly (CA) elections. Nevertheless, the parties differ considerably in their ideas of 
what type of federalism should be implemented. The Maoist 13-provinces identity-
based model has been heavily criticised by the country’s two largest political par-
ties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal – Unified Marxist 
Leninist (UML). Both parties cite the critical perspective on federalism as brought 
forward by the academic literature and argue that an identity-based system would 
ruin Nepal’s unity and create divisions in a society that has not seen major ethnic 
clashes in the past (ICG 2011): “Nepali Congress will never accept an ethnic-based 
federalism. This federalism will ruin Nepal’s unity and stability,” said late NC presi-
dent Sushil Koirala (Spotlight Nepal 2012). NC and UML instead contend that geo-
graphical boundaries with a mix of identity groups are the best way to ensure the 
viability of federal units. 
In 2012, differences between the parties meant that the State Restructuring 
High Level Recommendation Commission – formed by the political parties repre-
sented in the CA to suggest an appropriate model of federalism for Nepal – failed to 
agree on one model and submitted two reports. one report promoted the division of 
Nepal into 11 provinces based on identity, and the second report proposed restruc-
turing Nepal into six provinces based on economic and geographical characteristics. 
These differences are highlighted in Figure 1, which plots the level of support for 
federalism in general (left) and for delineating units according to identity (right). 
The graphs show that while there is strong support for federalist reform throughout 
society, the views of upper-caste, hill-based Hindus on identity-based federalism 
differ from those of Madhesi respondents.
These divisions between the groups were so strong that throughout the rule 
of the interim government (2007–2008) and the first CA (2008–2012), the Mao-
ists were unable to bring forward the policies they had promised the Madhesis and 
Tharus during the war. The polarisation of positions on the topic even led to the 
1 Nepali was declared a 
national language in 1930. 
The Madhesis, Tharus, and 
Janajatis have separate 
mother tongues.
   6    GIGA FoCUS | ASIA | No. 1 | MAy 2016 
dissolution of the first CA in 2012 without a constitution. The failure of the Mao-
ists to push for identity-based federalism also triggered an episode of violence in 
2007: as it became apparent that the interim constitution did not fully address 
Madhesi demands, protests erupted in the Tarai, resulting in the deaths of over 30 
people. The result was an eight-point agreement between the interim government 
and the UDMF accepting the Madhesis’ call for an autonomous “Madhesh” prov-
ince and thus their desire for identity-based federalism. The Maoists only moved 
closer to the NC and UML positions as a result of the 16-point compromise deal of 
8 June 2015 on constitutional provisions in the aftermath of the 2015 earthquakes. 
Factors behind the 2015 Escalation of Violence
The main political parties thus arrived at a peaceful answer to the federalist ques-
tion by promulgating the September 2015 constitution and deferring some of the 
contentious issues to be decided later. But this much awaited promulgation did 
not deepen social cohesion in Nepal. Instead, identity groups radicalised, and the 
chasms between the state and its citizens in the Tarai deepened. Several elements 
of the constitution-making process explain why the Madhesis and Tharus have felt 
increasingly sidelined, thus leading to the violence in 2015 and 2016. First and fore-
most, the Tarai communities have perceived the federalist debate as being severely 
dominated by upper-caste hill-origin Hindu politicians in Kathmandu, at the ex-
pense of marginalised groups’ voices and even as a result of the suppression of their 
voices through violent police action against protesters from August 2015 onwards. 
The Madhesi and Tharu communities – which fought in the Maoists’ People’s War 
in the hope that identity-based federalism would be the outcome of a Maoist vic-
tory – also perceive the Maoists’ acceptance of the geographical division of federal 
units under the new constitution as a major betrayal. They feel abandoned by their 
representatives in the capital. 
The perception of elite domination of the discourse and the fear of being pat-
ronised by upper-caste hill-origin Hindus goes beyond the political division of 
Kathmandu from the periphery: the Tharus and Madhesis also fear that the federal-
ist boundaries have been delineated to suit local political and economic ruling elites 
Figure 1. 
Support for Federal-
ism and Identity-
Based Federalism
Source [left panel]: 
Authors’ own illustra-
tion based on survey 
data from International 
IDEA (2013). The graph 
depicts the general level 
of support for (any kind 
of) federalism in Nepal.
Source [right panel]: 
Authors’ own illustration 
based on survey data 
from International IDEA 
(2013). The graph dis-
plays the level of support 
for delineating federalist 
provinces according to 
identity.
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in the designated federal states (Bhatt and Murshed 2009). This is partly because 
the lack of proportional representation in national state institutions has in the past 
given increased political leverage to upper-caste Chhetris and Bahuns from Nepal’s 
regions, instead of to the historically marginalised communities. The latter expect 
that identity-based federalism would expand their political representation while 
limiting that of the traditional ruling classes, and that upper-caste elites within 
identity-based federal units would inevitably have to cede some power to minorities 
and give Madhesis, Tharus, and Janajatis majority rule over some provinces. 
As a result, Madhesis and Tharus perceive the current geographical delinea-
tion as further undermining their political representation, because the units divide 
these groups so that they do not make up a majority in any of the provinces, which 
favours the ruling elites. Particularly the Tharus have voiced their discontent at the 
prospect of being split in two, and the Madhesis say the current model draws bor-
ders directly through their ancestral homeland. They also point out that resource 
distribution is highly unequal across the proposed units, with a potential long-term 
impact on their development. For instance, two of the provinces do not share a 
border with China, which is expected to put them at a distinct trade disadvantage 
in the long run. 
The delineation of federal provinces has also coincided with a number of insti-
tutional reforms and constitutional provisions that have accelerated fears among 
the Madhesis and Tharus that they will be pushed further to the margins, because 
these reforms reverse many of their past achievements. These fears relate to the 
debate on how federalism works in concordance with other reforms, underlining 
recent findings that post-war institutional reforms have joint effects on peace rather 
than working in isolation. 
In particular, the federalist reforms have been accompanied by the introduction 
of draconian citizenship laws that hurt the rights of both women and Madhesis, 
and of Madhesi women in particular. Prior to the 2006 Nepal Citizenship Act, only 
a father with Nepalese citizenship could transfer this citizenship to a child. Article 
11.2.b of the 2015 constitution states that a child whose father or mother is Nepalese 
can become a Nepalese citizen – it had been father and mother in previous drafts. 
However, legal experts argue that other clauses in the constitution override this 
statement. For instance, for women with Nepalese citizenship – but not men – the 
constitution requires children born in Nepal to obtain citizenship by descent, but 
while the children of Nepalese men married to a foreigner are entitled to citizen-
ship by descent, those of women married to a foreigner can only obtain citizenship 
through naturalisation. Madhesis – who often intermarry with families on the other 
side of the border in north India’s Bihar – perceive this law to be discriminatory. 
In addition to citizenship requirements, Nepal’s constitution originally also 
introduced an electoral law that dropped previous regulations on proportional 
representation and that would have left Tarai groups underrepresented in the par-
liament. Specifically, under the 2015 constitution, a smaller percentage of parlia-
mentary seats were to be elected through proportional representation than under 
the 2007 interim constitution (45 per cent as compared to 58 per cent of seats). 
Finally, the role of regional actors also complicates the situation. Nepal’s neigh-
bours India and China, which are competing for influence within Nepal, both per-
ceive themselves as being affected by federal reforms in Nepal. Both countries want 
fewer provinces on their border so that it is easier to deal with security issues. The 
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Chinese government is said to strongly oppose identity-based federalism because 
it fears a spillover of such ideas across Nepal’s border to the Tibet Autonomous 
Region. It has thus suggested to Nepal’s government that identity-based federalism 
should be avoided. During the blockade, Nepal turned to the Chinese government 
to seek new import opportunities, something which is logistically difficult due to the 
challenges of trading across the Himalayas. China has doubled its emergency aid to 
Nepal since the 2015 earthquake and will likely use Nepal’s dependency on Chinese 
aid to support parties opposed to identity-based federalism. The Indian govern-
ment, on the other hand, is generally in favour of federalism in Nepal, but – because 
it historically shares deep cultural ties with the Madhesis – is said to support the 
Madhesi struggle for identity-based federalism. It hosted rare high-profile visits of 
Madhesi leaders to India in 2015, and it has conveyed its interests through local 
Madhesi parties. India has more influence than China in Nepal’s internal affairs, 
though it has denied direct involvement in the border blockade. The influence of 
both regional powers can be regarded as affecting the opportunity structure of the 
state and of the Tarai protesters by further deepening already existing divisions and 
contributing to the polarisation of the debate within Nepal. 
Requirements for a Peaceful Solution
At first glance, the federalist debate in Nepal appears to be deadlocked particularly 
due to substantive differences about whether federal units should be delineated 
according to geography or identity; however, to a large extent it is also the man-
ner in which the federalist laws have been introduced that has driven the recent 
violence. Both sides in the debate have presented reasonable arguments for why 
they prefer one federalist model over the other, but due to elitism, the combination 
of laws that have accelerated and increased perceptions of marginalisation among 
 Madhesis and Tharus, and the further polarising role of regional powers, the sides 
have thus far failed to engage in a constructive dialogue. The federalist restructur-
ing of Nepal has therefore deepened rather than mitigated the cleavages between 
the state and its citizens in the Tarai. Highly exaggerated and emotional claims on 
the benefits and pitfalls of federalist restructuring have further polarised the de-
bate. These findings are of interest for both scholars and practitioners, who often 
look at the consequences of the actual design of post-war institutions but not at the 
process of producing these institutional reforms. 
Based on these findings, the most central and basic recommendation for policy-
makers and the international development community in Nepal is to ensure that 
any future solutions to the remaining demands of Madhesis and Tharus in Nepal 
are identified through a political dialogue that includes the marginalised groups in 
the Tarai to a significantly larger extent than has been the case thus far. As long as 
these groups feel marginalised in the process of designing future federal structures, 
as they do now, any proposition from the political elites in Kathmandu could lead 
to new violent unrest in the Tarai plains. The final model of federalist restructuring 
in Nepal – identity-based, geography-based, or a mix of both – should feel like a 
win-win situation to all parties involved, which is something that only an inclusive 
political dialogue can achieve. Substantively, policymakers should also ensure the 
wide-ranging resolution of minority demands instead of undertaking minor amend-
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ments to single laws. In particular, they should pursue a citizenship law that does 
not result in double discrimination against women and Madhesis.
More generally, the case of Nepal and the combined effect that constitutional 
provisions regarding (1) federalism, (2) citizenship, (3) a delineation of electoral 
constituencies, and (4) proportional representation have on marginalised groups’ 
fears of being sidelined provide a broader lesson for international policymakers: 
institutional reforms at the subnational and national level do not work in isolation 
but  rather interact closely, and together they mitigate or accelerate minority fears. 
Donors should thus pay greater attention to the interaction of post-war institu-
tional reforms on the ground rather than funding projects limited to one policy field 
or sector. 
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